What if the broader conception of Lackey`s theory of knowledge is given to disagreement? Perhaps the right rule of disagreement will still allow the importance of religious differences to be sensitive to the theory of epistemic certifications, but with the additional caveat that the theory of epistemological certifications can only alleviate the concerns raised by disagreements if one sticks to the theory and not just an unmotivated attempt to block disagreements. It is not clear how this changes the dialectic situation, because followers of a certain religious theory of epistemal certifications probably think that their theory is reasonable and is therefore not analogous to the prejudice of sexism. On the other hand, the correct rule of disagreement could deny that the probative importance of religious disagreements is sensitive to the theory of epismere certifications. One way to do this would be for the dispute rule to simply establish the correct theory of epistemological certifications. To do so, however, one would have to take a position on issues disputed for religious reasons. The resulting standard could not provide a religiously neutral motivation for religious skepticism. On the other hand, the standard may require that the assessment of a disagreement not be challenged and that both parties have the same weight in cases where there is no agreement on the corresponding information. But such a strong conciliatory standard would require a capitulation in disagreements with radical skeptics, which led Christensen and others to seek a conciliatory policy in principle, with more modest anti-question restrictions. In short, it is not clear whether there is a conciliatory, religiously neutral and not overly skeptical standard, but which totally prohibits relying on a certain theory of epistemic certifications to judge the importance of religious disagreement. John Hick (2004) offers a completely different characterization of evidence of first-rate religious disagreements. Instead of suggesting that such a disagreement is evidence of atheism, Hick suggests that such disagreements can instead be seen as evidence that true encounters with the “real” – that transcendent reality that is the source of salvation and found in all the major religions of the world – are inevitably understood by conceptual frameworks that prevent cognitive access without problems to reality. , as it is in itself and leads to various great world religions.
, and often contradictory, interpretations of such experiences. This position, which Hick calls “religious pluralism,” is not solely motivated by stubborn religious disagreements. Hick points out that the world`s major religions have all proven to be a vehicle for shifting practitioners from “self-centered” to “concentration of reality,” and this ethical parity over several beliefs is seen by Hick as undermining the basis of thought that a religious tradition can reasonably claim predominance in the lesdoing of its doctrine. However, it is clear that Hick`s pluralism would not be motivated if religious dialogue typically resulted in an end to religious differences and agreement on the teachings of a religious tradition.